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ness naturally and inevitably arises in an organism with sense-organs and brain.

In his earlier volume, Professor Strong showed that this hypothesis alone offers a satisfactory solution for the mind-body problem. (It retains a belief in the causal efficacy of mental states, as the interactionists wish; it retains a belief in the conservation of physical energy, as the parallelists wish; it even agrees, he now sees, with the automatist's assertion that the *data of consciousness* are epiphenomena, ghostly by-products of evolution, without causal efficacy—or even an existential status.) The two volumes, in spite of the change of terminology and the altered envisagement of the epistemological problem, complement each other, and present quite the keenest and completest argument for panpsychism that has yet been offered. At least, I can record that they have done far more than anything else in print to strengthen my own conviction, now of some twenty years' standing, that the truth lies in this direction.

I have passed entirely over many interesting points, in the effort, within a very brief compass, to indicate what is most significant. The chances are that I have not expressed the argument quite as Mr. Strong would have had me express it—we have never yet, in correspondence, been able entirely to satisfy each other, or the other members of our group! I recommend the readers of the JOURNAL, therefore, to hold lightly my words and to read Mr. Strong's carefully thought out and painstakingly expressed exposition for themselves.

DURANT DRAKE.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

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#### REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series, Vol. XVIII. (1917-18). London: Williams & Norgate. 1918. Pp. 663.

In the midst of war English philosophy has prospered. The mere bulk of the Aristotelian Society's latest collection of papers is surprising, the more so that one paper is here only in abstract, and one entire symposium is not here at all. In quality the volume is likewise remarkable. The relative impressions left on those who were privileged to hear read and discussed the papers in this volume and in its predecessor, I do not know; I can judge only from the printed page; but certainly the improvement in quality in the present volume, as over its predecessor, seems to me more striking than the increase in bulk. The volume is a notable one.

Turning to the subject-matter of these papers, my first query is,

What has become of English "new realism"? Messrs. S. Alexander and G. E. Moore are here—in forms that astonish. But I begin to wonder whether English new realism was not, after all, only a chance conjunction of thinkers, each following his own orbit, and now tending to separate wider and wider. Mr. S. Alexander's paper, presented here in abstract and entitled "Space-Time," is to me bewildering. I gather that the ultimate elements of the world are motions, and motion involves both places and times, so that space and time are intimately conjoined. Space must have three dimensions, because time has three characters—succession, irreversibility, and betweenness. This reminds me, indeed, that I once heard a lecturer who proved the doctrine of the Trinity from the fact that matter has three forms—solid, liquid, and gas. But Mr. Alexander goes on gaily to tell us that "Time is the mind of Space," and "Space-Time is the stuff out of which all existents are made," and so I here drop the subject, as being beyond my depth, and lest I say something foolish. Mr. G. E. Moore's paper is a criticism of Bradley. It strikes a blow fit to cleave Mr. Bradley asunder—only I have a suspicion Bradley is not standing at the point where the blow descends. That quality, which appears in Moore, of measured and open-eyed consideration of doubts, and striving after absolute precision, appears here also in the articles by Mr. J. A. Smith and Miss Dorothy Wrinch, the latter a little gem of logic. But the users of this method are peculiarly prone to misrepresent the proportions of the whole in their meticulous care about the parts; and prove to surfeit what needs no proving, while the real problem remains untouched.

The absence of political philosophy is also noteworthy in this volume—and perhaps that is one reason for its superiority over its predecessor, since good political philosophy is rare. Mr. Scott's "Realism and Politics," and the opening pages of Mr. Hetherington's article, are, however, well worthy of our consideration, because of the important tendency in current political thought which is there examined. Realism is, in this instance, used in its more non-philosophical sense, to mean a preference for the existent brute fact and a depreciation of the ideal. It consists in a liking for "given" reality, as raw as possible, uncooked, untampered with. It is to be found alike among philosophers, says Scott, in Russell and in Bergson, and brings these two apparently antipathetic thinkers together. It leads Russell, in his social philosophy, to minimize the importance, and apparently even the desirability, of reason in actual human affairs, leads him to say impulses are what shape the world. It leads those syndicalists who have adopted Bergson as their philosopher—adopted him somewhat after the fashion of "the dog who

adopted a man" in the comic papers—to say in substance, "Down with your Utopias, down with your Ideals that never come true, start the social revolution and let it work itself out whithersoever it will." Such a social philosophy may put on airs as one that is mature and disillusioned. It may become such a Buddhistic disillusionment as finds expression in Mr. Russell's "A Free Man's Worship"—"Farewell, proud world, I'm going home—to the Nirvana of Mathematical Bliss." But whether it be as mature and wise as it is disillusioned, may perhaps be doubted. It is a giving up, so far as active life is concerned, of all that makes men men, a loss of faith in social purposes and ideals; and the question may well be asked, "Without a faith, not merely in reason in the abstract, but in at least some power of reason in this world of today and tomorrow, how long will the hard and arduous road of reason itself be followed; how long could we keep alive in another world a spirit so feeble and helpless and hopeless that it can not live and work in this?" Bergson has already made the sacrifice: for him the glory of the intellect is foolishness, the world of the ideal is a pale reflex of the real, and the social life of man is the chance refluence of rivulets of feelings that once upon a time diverged. And with these as our philosophical leaders of today, perhaps it is not to be wondered at that an idealism undisillusioned enough to believe in ideals is nowadays so rare.

Very closely connected with the subject just considered is an essay in characterization of Bergsonian intuition, by Mrs. Karin Costelloe Stephen. She insists, and rightly I think, that Bergson's intuition is no return to primitive consciousness. But I should prefer to put somewhat differently the conclusion to be drawn. Never having been a cow, at least so far as I can remember my previous transmigrations, I can not be sure just how it feels to be a cow. But I imagine a cow to live in a world of what Bergson would call "symbolic knowledge." Yonder green means "something to eat," and then one goes and eats, and that is all there is to it. There is no voluptuous enjoyment of greenness for its own sake. A cow world is a world of signs and symbols. Yet Bergson seems to suggest that signs and symbols are among the vices of high civilization, intellectual products of applied science, when the scientific man, in the fullness of time, set out to build bridges. But every mind uses some crude sort of signs and symbols. The really remarkable thing is that the civilized man should have any notion of setting out to build bridges at all—neither a cow nor M. Bergson would ever have thought of such a thing. The world of ideals is for Mr. Russell a world afar, for M. Bergson it is as if it were not.

What is it that M. Bergson wants, the which he finds symbolic

knowledge can not give him? It is not change and evolution. Existentially, that symbolism called language is a wonderfully fluid thing, sometimes distressingly so. And as for the meanings it conveys, only a neglect of the facts could have led to the current opinion that language is more suited to express the unchanging. Our own English tongue gives us twenty verbs to characterize action and transformation and movement, for one term that denotes the unchanging and the eternal. Language, itself an activity, is most at home in a realm of activities. But Bergson does not really hate symbolic knowledge because he thinks it gives us the permanent. Evolutionist though he calls himself, change and evolution are not what M. Bergson most truly delights in. He even speculates about a God for whom, as for Professor Royce's Absolute, the whole panorama of time should be gathered up in one eternal, world-embracing, time-inclusive vision. But what rejoices M. Bergson's soul is the quality of the world. M. Bergson hates signs and symbols because they take us away from immediate immersion in quality. Language can not give us the feel of a throb of joy or pain, the blending tints of field and sky, the toll of a distant bell. For the appreciation of these experiences, we must turn away from books and spoken words to things; and to things, not as the peasant uses them, but as the artist sees them and feels them, the artist who dwells on their peculiar *quale*, their richness of color and savor. To linger over this endlessly various body and stuff of the world, to taste, to drink deep its manifold flavors, to do that would be to live. If M. Bergson calls for change, it is because change can give us a new sensation, and a new relish, every minute, to add to our treasures of memory. And his appeal to us to wake up to these things, is in its place good. But while making this appeal to us, Bergson leaves out of his account other things that are more wonderful yet, other things that civilization should also mean for us: namely, the world of the ideal, and the world of social intercourse. To those things he seems almost as blind as the cow we considered above—the cow which lives in a world of mere sign knowledge, where all things are categorized as good to eat and not good to eat—is irresponsible and blind to the changing glories of the dawn. The world of the ideal, as we have said, and the social world also, we may add, is for M. Bergson as if they were not.

Another Bergsonian paper in this volume is Carr's Presidential Address on "Mind and Body," with the thesis, "The mind as a whole interacts with the body as a whole." Good as the paper is, I can not grant that the thesis is established. Admitting that interaction appears to occur, his way of describing it has an element of truth; but equally is it true that parts of mind do seem to interact

with parts of body. And what empirical foundation is there, after all, for the view that the mind is a whole, in the sense of being the very ideal of a tight organism, changing as a unit, every part affecting every other part? I confess to disliking the method Carr employs, as one hard to bring to empirical tests; and I believe there is much more hope from such methods of piecemeal discussion as are exemplified in C. D. Broad's recent masterly handling of the same question (*Monist*, April, 1918). The problem of psychophysical interaction leads us over into the general field of the vitalism controversy; and this latter furnished the subject for a symposium of scientific men, before the Aristotelian Society, which is reported in the present volume. The question was, "Are physical, biological, and psychological categories irreducible?" The papers presented are admirable expressions of the temperamental attitudes of different scientific men to this question. That of D'Arcy Thompson, defending a methodological mechanist position, appeals to me as capital, in its open-eyed and genial good sense.

Another symposium in this volume is a sort of metaphysical idealist love-feast, in which Messrs. Bosanquet, Seth Pringle-Pattison, Stout, and Haldane take part. But they are not without their little differences among themselves, and the three latter proceed to take Bosanquet to task for reducing human personalities to adjectives of the Absolute. The admirers of Bradley's theory of judgment, and Bradley's, and after him Bosanquet's, development of it into a metaphysic, may not be willing to agree with me, but for my part I find myself saying, "Amen," to almost every point Pringle-Pattison makes. I rather think Bradley and Bosanquet are the better idealists; but to my notion Pringle-Pattison's is the more humanly satisfying philosophy, and, so far as it is here expressed, also the truer as well; though truth and satisfyingness, I fear, may not prove ultimately synonymous.

Theology, at least as it concerns the relation of the concept of an Absolute to the concept of a God, plays a very large rôle in the present volume. It is not only raised in the idealist symposium, but also two other of the ablest papers in the volume grapple with it directly. In one of these, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller has a "real Bishop" to argue with, on the question of "Omnipotence," and fairly outdoes himself in smashing the Absolute. Even better, however, is Mr. A. E. Taylor's exposition of Proclus, wherein he attributes to Proclus so many extraordinary words of wisdom about some of the greatest problems of philosophy, that Proclus would have to be placed several grades higher than usual in the scale of philosophers, did one not suspect that perhaps it is Taylor who deserves elevation instead.

Another paper, less brilliant than these, Mr. Albert A. Cock's discussion of "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," is the one, however, which I should like to take some space here to scrutinize. The paper is, I believe, successful in its rejoinders to most of the current criticisms of the ontological proof. And yet, I am more convinced than ever of the invalidity of that proof. The author establishes, I think, that the proof does not amount to saying, "The sum-total of existence exists." If it proves anything, it proves there exists, in the fullest sense of the term "exists," a God who is perfect in goodness. A good God that really exists is better than one that does not, therefore a perfectly good God must be one that exists. And he establishes, also, that if it proves as much as this, it can, furthermore, prove that a personal Devil exists (his argument to show the Devil would be impersonal, seems to me mistaken). An existent personal Devil would be far worse than an imaginary or impersonal Devil. And I think he meets squarely the Kantian argument that existence is not an ordinary predicate; and maintains that, granting this contention, the proof still holds. Verily, this is a startling situation, for we have been trusting in Kant to defend us.

But I think the author is right, and for the following reasons, wherein I depart from the author's mode of presentation. A good God would have to be existent. The reason why is simply this, that a non-existent somewhat is nothing, absolutely nothing; it is nonsense to talk of its being good or bad, or having any other quality such as existent things may have. I am quite aware that our various value-theorists, approaching value from the psychological side, have convinced themselves pretty generally that we can value a thing and even explicitly judge it to be valuable, without judging that it exists. But they seem a little too much inclined to take for granted that, because in the psychological realm of judgments there can be supposals, and assumptions, and judgments about the possible, therefore there can, metaphysically, be things that exist only in possibility, or in idea, or in essence, being the same in quality as something that elsewhere exists fully or could so exist, but possessed, in the case here in question, of some amphibious half-being and half-non-being. This seems to me false, if not absurd, metaphysics; and furthermore, even if true, it would not offer genuine help in the present problem. There are those, I know, who maintain that in the worship of a God, what we really worship is the bare ideal of goodness. They may go on to say that adding existence and power to this, would only be to degrade it. At least they agree that you can not make the idea of goodness better by annexing to it some sort of existence or embodiment. If these theses were correct, I do not

see why we should ever be called upon to do a good act, if the good act which is only an "idea" were not made in some very definite sense a better one by being done. Not only the idealist, but also the hypocrite and the knowing evil-doer may rejoice in the possession of the mere "idea of a good act," and not always to their own betterment. "But it is not your thought of good," it will be said, "but goodness, the essence, the concept—that is what is not made better by adding existence." This I grant, but I think the reason is very simple: goodness *per se* is neither good nor bad, any more than the concept of life is alive; the things that are properly denominated good are people, and moral actions, and the like. These lovers of the abstract good are so fearful of confounding goodness with mere existence or brute power, that they are apprehensive even to have them conjoined. It seems to me, on the contrary, that a God in whom goodness was associated with power would necessarily be a better sort of a God than one who had only goodness. And as for existence, I should suppose an existent and good God would be better than one that was non-existent by the entire amount of his goodness, for a "non-existent entity" is, ontologically, nothing, and his goodness is nil. And it is a mere plain fact, that to those who deeply value and worship a God, his existence does matter a great deal. They may not judge him actual every time they judge him precious to them or good. One judges only what is to the judge at the moment something which is in question; a judgment is an answer to a challenge. We never really do, however, call things good which we think do not exist. There is, it is true, a sort of play-mood wherein we do put aside existence questions deliberately, but that is a very sophisticated and really complex affair. Nothing, however, that I have just been saying should be interpreted as a denial that we can hypothetically discuss the goodness of the non-existent. Such discussions are of the greatest importance. But what we mean, when we assess the value of the possible or the ideal is always this: "If my ideal existed, then it would have this or this grade of goodness." Thus our argument has outflanked the Kantian position. No question need be raised as to whether existence is another sort of a predicate from goodness. It is indeed another sort. But we have established that for something to be good presupposes its existing, which is what the ontological proof set out to demonstrate.

However, there is something further to be considered. We have established that if something is perfectly good—truly, we have gone further and established that if it is good at all, then that thing is existent. But we have not yet gotten it out of the *if-then* form. We have not established that anything really is good. Our author, following his own line of discussion, has only seemingly done so;

and the reason is, that he has committed the fallacy into which Meinong fell with his "Golden Mountain." In substance, Meinong argued this way: "It is only in essence or in possibility that a golden mountain exists. It does not exist in fact, certainly not in space and time. Yes, but how then about 'The Golden Mountain that really is in space and time'? Does not that particular golden mountain have to be existent and to have a place and a date? Would it not involve a contradiction to deny to it existence?" Meinong remains perplexed. The answer to the puzzle seems to me to have been given by Mr. Bertrand Russell, and substantially the same answer is repeated in this volume by Mr. G. E. Moore, in the Bradley article mentioned above. A golden mountain does not exist even in idea, if by "idea" you have reference to a genuine meaning, and not a mental image. If it did, then it would have to exist in fact, if it were the idea of a golden mountain in actual space and time. There is here present, as subject-matter thought about, only the notion of "a single something," and the concepts of "being made of gold" and "being a mountain." But these coalesce to form no unity, such as you could point out as "The Golden Mountain," either in essence, or in idea, or in an assumed "world of possibilities." So you can perfectly well say, "The Golden Mountain is non-existent," or, "Round-squares are unreal," or, "Unicorns do not exist." You can do this without meaning that they have a new sort of being called unreal being, or non-existent reality. You do not make these things existent even in idea; no, not even only setting them up long enough to knock them down again. What you mean is simply this: "No thing is made of gold and is a mountain," "No thing both is round and is square." I do not have to postulate that round-squares exist in idea, in order that I may deny they exist in any sense, and thus contradict myself. And likewise with the case which led us to the present inquiry. I do not have to suppose that there is a "God perfect in goodness" existing in idea, in order that I may deny he exists in fact; for if I admit he is real in any sense, I admit that he is so in the fullest sense and in fact. There is no contradiction, therefore, in saying, "A God perfect in goodness does not exist," for what I really say is, "There is no being that is perfectly good." Now the ontological proof is an argument from necessity. If the proof is valid, the last proposition we have just laid down must be self-contradictory. But it is not. Hence the proof can not be valid.

I am inclined to think that the proposition, "Nothing is perfectly good," is not merely lacking in self-contradictoriness, but is also true. There may, for all I know, actually be a God who is exceedingly good, good beyond all mortal attainment of goodness. But

“perfect goodness” is another matter. As Mr. Schiller well says, if you raise power, or goodness, or what not, to infinity, you may simply destroy it. That is what I think happens here. “The Good,” or “Perfect Godness,” seems mere words to me. Some things are better than others, as some people are fatter than others. But why should there have to be, therefore, a person who is the *ne plus ultra* of superlative fatness, who is “perfect in fatness”? Or why should there be something called “The Fat”? Doubtless we have need of a criterion of goodness. But I do not see why that criterion has to be either “The Good,” or “a Being that is perfect in goodness,” any more than the tape-measure by which we might measure fatness would have itself to be absolutely fat. I would, therefore, deny that we can so much as have an intelligible idea of what it would mean for something to be perfectly good. And that granted, even the very first premise of the ontological proof is overthrown.

But my discussion will be defeating its own purpose, if I continue longer, and prevent such readers as I may have had from turning at once to the rich variety of those much more admirable discussions, which the volume we have been passing in review presents, in such unusual measure, for our enjoyment.

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#### JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW: March, 1919. *Report of the Committee of the National Research Council* (pp. 83-149): ROBERT M. YERKES.—The organization of the Psychology Committee, its service, reports of the various sub-committees are given in detail. *Chromatic Thresholds of Sensation from Center to Periphery of the Retina and their Bearing on Color Theory, Part II.* (pp. 150-163): C. E. FERREE and GERTRUDE RAND.—The claim has been made by followers of the Hering theory that the sensitivity of the retina to the pairs of colors falls off in a constant ratio from the center of the periphery of the retina. There is no basis of fact for a claim that a constant ratio of sensitivity to the pairs of colors red and green, and blue and yellow obtains in all parts of the retina.

Flournoy, Theodore. *Metaphysique et Psychologie.* (Deuxieme edition) Geneve: Librairie Kundig. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. Pp. 195.

W. E. A. Education Year Book. London: Workers' Education Association. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1918. Pp. 507.